Strategic Market Interaction
The course is an introduction to the fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design to enable a rigorous analysis of strategic market interaction. It covers static and dynamic games under complete and incomplete information. The course emphasizes theoretical foundations of game theory and develops knowledge on the standard equilibrium notions in different environments. Motivations are drawn from topics in industrial organization, auction and market design, as well as information engineering and networked systems. Also social and economic contexts will be covered in order to put the engineering and industrial organization applications into a broader perspective.
The contents of the compulsory microeconomics courses in the bachelor curriculum, Bachelor’s degree
There will be a final exam (60 minutes) at the end of the semester. The exam covers all materials from the lectures and exercise classes.
Master students who pass the exam will receive 2.5 ECTS points.
The lectures as well as the exercise classes will be held in English.
- Vega-Redondo, F. (2003), Economics and the Theory of Games, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (2007), Game Theory, Cambridge, MIT Press.
- Krishna, V. (2002), Auction Theory, Academic Press.
Please contact Edmund Baker in case you have any questions or if you would like to participate in this course.
Course Outline (preliminary)
- Strategic Form Games
- Dynamic Games with Complete Information
- Static Games with Incomplete Information
- Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
- Auction Theory
- Mechanism Design